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The East Asian crisis has stimulated an intensive debate. not only on the causes,
but on the policy actions that have been adopted in response to the initial shock.  The
question perhaps at the center of the most vehement dispute is:  to what extent can tight
monetary policy help restore market confidence?  Many economists have acknowledged
that monetary restriction was necessary to  achieve stabilization in the crisis countries.
Some, however, have argued that under the prevailing circumstances, rising real interest
rates might fail to bolster market confidence and thus prove counter-productive.'  Indeed,
some features of the East Asian economies, i.e. bank-based financial systems and high
leverage, appear particularly conducive to a significant credit channel of transmission of
monetary/financial shocks.  The magnifying effects stemming from this channel render
these economies particularly vulnerable to monetary/financial shocks.
While  some  have  already  provided preliminary  evidence  that  credit  channel
effects may have triggered a credit crunch in East Asia,) relatively little work has been
done trying to assess the magnitude of the impact.  In this  paper, we  focus on South
Korea (henceforth Korea) in an attempt to perform such an  assessment.  We focus on
Korea mainly for three reasons.  First, Korea is the most developed among the five East
Asian  crisis  countries,  namely,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  and
Thailand.  Among these countries, Korea probably enjoys the most developed financial
l  For instance. Feldstein (1998) claims that high real interest rates caused more harm  than good by leading to
widespread bankruptcies. thus undermining the prospect of loan repayment.
2  See. for example. Ding. Domac. and Ferri (1998).
3markets where  corporations can issue sizable amounts of both  bonds and commercial
paper. As such, were we to find strong lending channel effects for Korea, there would be
a  strong presupposition that  analogous effects could possibly apply to  the other crisis
countries.  Second, the intensity of monetary restriction in Korea was by most measures
the highest, thus making it the best candidate to identify the propagation of the monetary
shock through the credit channel.  Third, some of the relevant data necessary to test our
hypotheses were promptly available for Korea but not for the other crisis countries.
Analyzing the relationship between some specific interest rate spreads capturing
credit channel effects and industrial production constitutes the crux of our investigation.
More specifically, we perform various statistical tests to assess the direction of causality
between the spreads and industrial production.  We also make an attempt to quantify the
impact of the credit channel variables on industrial production.  Furthermore, we test the
commonly  held  hypothesis  that  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  suffer
disproportionately from the adverse consequences of the credit channel.  To this end, we
contrast the results obtained  for the overall  index of industrial  production with  those
obtained for the index of industrial production of SMEs.
The empirical  results  underscore that  causality  clearly runs  from  the  spreads
capturing  credit  channel  effects  to  production;  the  causality  is  stronger  for  SMEs'
production than it is for overall production.  Regarding the size of the impact, we find
that  a  1  percentage  point  increase  in  the  spread  between  bank  lending  rate  and
Government bond rate is associated with  a decline of  1.4 percent  in overall industrial
production and a decline of 1.7 percent in SMEs'  industrial production.  Considering that
this spread has increased by at least 5 percentage points after the initial shock and the
4inception of the restrictive monetary policy, this could imply a drop of around 7 percent
for overall  industrial production and  somewhere between 8 and  9 percent for  SMEs'
industrial production.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a non-technical
exposition of our approach to identify credit channel effects.  Section 3 briefly describes
the  developments leading to  a  credit  crunch  in the  aftermath of  the crisis  in  Korea.
Section 4 presents the empirical framework and the results.  Section 5 concludes  the
paper.
2. A NON-TECHNICAL EXPOSITION OF THE APPROACH
2.1 The Framework
Our approach is inspired by the method that we find most convincing, namely,
relying on the spread between bank lending rates and a  set of market interest rates on
various other risk-free and risk-bearing assets.  The conjecture we follow is rather simple
(see Bernanke and Blinder, 1988).  A decline in either bank loans or a decline in their
growth  following a  monetary  tightening  is  not  sufficient  to  pin  down  an  adverse
movement in banks'  loan supply.  This is because the decline could be induced either by
the corporate sector demanding less credit -- because fewer investments are undertaken --
or by the banks' reluctance to lend.  By contrast, if the decline in (the dynamics of) bank
loans is coupled with a widening of the spread between bank lending rates and the rates
prevailing on analogous non-bank debt market instruments, then it can be argued that an
5adverse shift in the banks' supply of loans is curtailing credit.  In fact, such a situation is
consistent with only two possibilities: either  supply has declined whereas demand has
not, or supply has declined more than demand.
Furthermore, we follow the widely held recommendation (Bemanke and Gertler,
1995; Hubbard, 1995) to split the credit channel impact into two separate components:
the balance sheet effect and the lending channel effect.
The  balance  sheet  effect  emphasizes  the  potential  depressing  impact  of  the
monetary  squeeze  on  borrowers'  assets  and  profits,  by  affecting  variables  such  as
borrowers' net worth, cash flow and liquid assets, which increases the risk premium. The
increase in the level of interest rates triggered by the monetary squeeze raises corporate
risks because it reduces both  business profits and  the value of  assets that  firms  have
posted as collateral.  This will generally increase the wedge between the interest rates at
which corporates can borrow and the yields on otherwise analogous risk-free assets.
By contrast, the bank lending channel effect focuses on the retrenchment in the
supply  of  loans  by  depository  institutions  in  the  wake  of  the  monetary  restriction.
Specifically, the chain of actions runs as follows.  The monetary squeeze raises the level
of  interest rates even for risk-free assets  such as T-bills  and  Govemment  bonds.  In
general. banks cannot increase deposit rates by as much since they have to build required
reserves which either bear no-remuneration or offer a below-market yield.  This means
that banks suffer a deposit drain as investors reshuffle their portfolios away from deposits
and towards assets with more attractive yields.  Banks are not indifferent between making
loans  to  the  private  sector  and  holding  Govemment  securities  --  i.e.  Government
securities provide a cost efficient way to carry a secondary liquidity cushion, and banks
6may  be  unwilling  to  deplete their  holding  of  such  securities  below  some  threshold.
Accordingly, following the deposit drain, they will probably enact a restriction in their
loan supply.  If all firms were indifferent between borrowing at banks and issuing debt on
the market,  this  would  not  imply that  bank  lending  rates should  increase  more than
corporate debt market rates.  In reality, however, we know that the majority of businesses
do not issue debt on the market.  Consequently, after the monetary tightening we can
expect that the wedge between bank lending rates and corporate debt market rates may
also increase. 3
Finally, we rely on previous studies built  on the hypothesis that credit channel
effects are likely to be most important for those firms which, being unable to issue debt
on the market, could be classified as bank-dependent borrowers.  This suggests that the
credit channel is likely to particularly penalize the small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), 4 most of which are de facto  bank-dependent borrowers. 5 An additional reason
for SMEs being disproportionately affected by credit  channel effects derives from the
possibility that the monetary squeeze triggers a flight to quality in bank lending.  More
specifically, banks may respond to the monetary restriction, not only  restraining credit
generally, but also by adopting more stringent lending policies vis-a-vis customers that
3  A similar  impact  could be induced  by the introduction  of stricter  regulations  on banks:  e.g. the imposition  of
higher  capital  adequacy  ratios  (Bernanke  and Lown  (1992)).
4  Gertler  and Gilchrist  (1994)  show evidence  consistent  with  this hypothesis.
S  In the first place.  SMEs are too small  to justify the fixed costs entailed  by listing securities. In addition,  even
when  they have  the intention  of issuing  debt on the market.  they will  most likely  refrain  from doing  so.  Because
of the low  liquidity  of their debt.  investors  would  ask for very  high  yields,  thus making  issuance  unattractive.
7are perceived to be  less credit worthy. 6 That is, when  a deposit drain squeezes their
resources, banks will try to cherry-pick customers who are ex ante more credit-worthy:
e.g. those having a more established credit record or those able to post more collateral. 7
In turn, as stressed by Bernanke, Gertler, and  Gilchrist (1996), the flight to  quality in
bank lending may trigger a financial accelerator effect along the following causal chain:
the  negative  shock  precipitates  the  economy  into  a  recession;  the  recession  makes
borrowing constraints tighter; tighter borrowing constraints amplify the recession, and so
on. 8
A final ingredient that suggests SMEs are more penalized by the credit channel
derives from the possibility that when a financial crisis ensues, depositors may also enact
a flight to quality (safety). Envisaging increased bank fragility, depositors may shift their
savings towards institutions that are perceived to be less likely to go bankrupt.  To the
extent that the smaller banks are seen as less likely to be bailed out by the Government,
they may be the ones to suffer most in the deposit flight.  Thus, it is likely that the
institutions which receive new flows of funds have no established relationship with the
borrowers of those institutions losing resources.  Accordingly, the institutions receiving
new flows are not likely to make loans to those borrowers.  In this case, an additional
6  Bernanke. Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) report evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  A negative bias similar
to that regarding SMEs might apply to fast-growing firms, since they  have a higher ratio of expected future
profits to the current value of physical assets and thus can provide lower collateral.
7  Lenders perceive SMEs to be more risky since they generally have a shorter track record and typically release
less --and less structured-- infornation.
8  A  model  deploying financial  accelerator  effects  vas proposed by  Kyiotaki  and  Moore (1997).  Lang  and
Nakamura (1995) report evidence of a flight to quality in bank lending within the US.
8credit squeeze may hit those customers borrowing from smaller banks, 9 and SMEs, more
than other firms, typically depend on small banks' lending."
The relationship between bank  lending rate spreads and productive activity has
been widely studied in the tradition of the credit channel.  Referring to the US, several
studies provide convincing empirical evidence on the importance of the above mentioned
interest rate spreads.  Kashyap, Stein, and  Wilcox (1993) show that,  in general, tight
monetary conditions bring about a widening in the spread between commercial paper rate
and T-bill rate; Gertler, Hubbard, and Kashyap (1991), as well as Friedman and Kuttner
(1998) document that an increase in the spread is a good predictor of a subsequent decline
in investment and real output.
Nonetheless,  analyzing  the  relationship  between  interest  rate  spreads  and
productive activity is however not exclusive to the literature on the credit channel.  For
instance, Stock and Watson (1989) include two interest rate spreads in their well known
composite  leading indicator: the spread between commercial paper and Treasury bills
with 6-month maturity at issue on one hand and the yield spread between 10-year and 1-
year Treasury bonds on the other.  Moreover, Estrella and Mishkin (1998) show that the
slope of the yield curve -- as measured by the difference between 10-year Treasury bonds
and 3-month Treasury bills -- has proved the out-of-sample predictor of recessions in the
USA  over  the  years  1971-1995 among  a  set  comprising  various  monetary/financial
variables, some macro-indicators and various leading indicators.
9  Kashyap and Stein (1994.  1997) argue that small banks. rather than large ones. are more likely to be hit by
monetary restrictions.
92.2 The Meaning  of the Various  Interest  Rate Spreads
The objective  of our analytical  framework  is twofold. First, we want to assess the
overall impact  attributable  to credit  channel  effects. Second,  we wish to decompose  this
impact into its two parts: the balance sheet effect and the lending channel effect.  In
pursuing  the latter objective,  we also make an attempt to appraise  the lessons  learned on
the link between  the yield curve and production.
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In order to assess the impact  attributable  to credit channel  effects,  in line with the
literature,  we take the spread  between  marginal  bank lending  rates and Treasury  bonds as
representative  of the overall impact of the credit channel."  Our first choice was which
10  Berger,  Kashyap  and Scalise  (1995)  document  a strong  correlation  between  relative  size of the lending  bank and
relative  size  of the borrowing  firm  in the US: i.e. small  firms tend to borrow  from small  banks  and large  firms to
borrow  from large  banks. Angeloni  et al (1995)  present  analogous  evidence  for Italy.
11  Before  focusing  on the sole spread,  we have checked  that the spread -- as well as its two major components  that
we will introduce  shortly  - tends  to increase  in conjunction  with either  a decrease  or a deceleration  in lending,
10bank lending rate to select among the three rates available.  In particular, we could select
either the rate on general loans, the rate on overdraft loans, or the (lowest and highest)
rate  on loans overdue.  Figure  1 illustrates, over  the relevant period, the relationship
between  the  three  lending  rates,  and  the  overnight  rate,  supposedly  determined  by
monetary policy actions and representing the cost at which banks can raise funds on the
interbank market. 12
It is easy to see that both the rate on general loans and that (lowest and highest) on
loans overdue are quite sticky relative to the overnight rate, whereas the overdraft rate
proves much more responsive.  Such stickiness stems from banks'  rate setting which does
not fully reflect market conditions and, as such, might not be fully indicative of the terms
at which new loans may be obtained by businesses -- especially considering that lending
rate stickiness could be associated with larger quantity rationing of loans. '3  This is the
main reason why we decided to adopt the overdraft rate which seems to be the only one
of the three to promptly reflect changes in banks'  cost of funds.' 4 Given the typically
thus solving the identification problem described above.  Indeed, the correlation coefficient  over the period
1992.01-1998.02  between  spreads.  namely  SPRO. SPRI.  SPR2.  and  SPR3  and  changes  in  real  loans  is
respectively -0.49. -0.51. -0.35. and -0.29.
12  Figure I starts from 1996.07. the first month for which data on the actual average lending rate (both the overdraft
and the general  loan) are available.  Before  1996.07. two rates (both  for  overdraft and general  loan)  were
published: the highest and the lowest.  In the empirical part of this paper. we obviously  need to use a longer
series of the overdraft rate that  ve select.  At first. we considered constructing the average overdraft rate for the
period 1992.01 - 1996.06 by taking the mid-point between the highest and the lowest overdraft rates.  However,
for the period (1996.07 - 1997:03) over which we could observe all three rates (actual average overdraft. highest
and lowest overdraft). we detected that the mid-point criterion would result in a grossly unsatisfactory estimate
of the actual average overdraft rate. without a systematic bias.  Therefore. we had to adopt a different strategy.
To this end. we estimated the actual average overdraft rate as a function of the money market rate over the period
1996.07-1998.02. and found that the latter explains almost 80 percent of the variability in the former.  We then
used the estimated relationship to construct the average overdraft lending rate for the missing period.
13  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)  show that banks  may refrain from  raising  lending rates  and rely more  on credit
rationing due to asymmetric information and the resulting adverse selection problem.
14  To the extent that we want to take a lending rate which is representative of the condition at the margin, the fact
that overdraft loans constitute only 5 to 6 percent of total loans at Korean banks has little consequence for us.
11short maturity of overdraft loans, it would be desirable to measure the spread between the
lending rate and T-bill rates, this, however, turns out to be impossible since issues of T-
bills in Korea were scant over our period of analysis.
Concerning the decomposition of the overall credit channel  effect  into its two
parts,  we  measure the spread  indicative  of the  balance sheet effect  as the  difference
between rates on corporate bonds and rates on Treasury bonds.  The proxy for the lending
channel effect is given by the spread between the lending rate and the rate on 6-month
commercial paper.  The rationale for selecting these two spreads is simple.  First, the
difference between rates on corporate and on Treasury bonds measures the general risk
premium as it is perceived by the market.  If the balance sheet effect is at work, we expect
that this spread will increase after the monetary restriction, reflecting the fact that private
sector debt has become relatively riskier vis-a-vis sovereign debt.  Second, the difference
between lending rates and  commercial paper rates quantifies the  premium that  bank-
dependent borrowers must pay in order to raise external finance relative to those firms
able to issue debt on the market.  The lending channel effect postulates that this spread
will increase in the aftermath of the monetary squeeze, for the reasons discussed above.
To be sure, the decomposition of the difference between the lending rate and the Treasury
bond rate into the rate spread between corporate and Treasury bonds on one hand and the
rate spread between loans and commercial paper on the other, predicates the existence of
a third component.  This last component is given by the spread between corporate bond
rate and commercial paper rate.  Considering that overlap is likely between those firms
issuing bonds and those issuing commercial paper, we can assume that this third spread
12proxies for the slope of the yield curve.  In fact, corporate bonds typically have a maturity
at issue of 36 months compared with 6 months for commercial paper." 5
All in all, the set of interest rate spreads can easily be grasped from the following
expression:
SPRO =  LR- TB=SPR1  +  SPR2 +  SPR3  1)
where
LR = lending rate;
TB = Treasury bond rate;
SPRI  = corporate bond rate - Treasury bond rate;
SPR2 = lending rate - commercial paper rate;
SPR3 = commercial paper rate - corporate bond rate.
The expected impact of the three spreads on  industrial production is  negative,
since the first and the second reflect the adverse impact of the balance sheet effect and the
lending channel effect, whereas an increase in the third spread is likely to be associated
with a subsequent downturn in economic activity.
1  5  Since  Treasury  bonds  typically  have a maturity  at issue  of 60 months.  strictly  speaking.  the first spread  does not
provide a  fully accurate measure of the general risk premium of  private debt versus Treasury debt but
incorporates  also a term structure  component. Given that we could observe  neither  a 60-month  corporate  bond
yield nor a 36-month  Treasurv  bond yield. it was impossible  for us to unbundle  the two components  in the first
spread. It is well known. however.  that yield curve spreads tend to be more meaningful  at relatively  shorter
maturities  than at longer  ones:  this is certainly  the case if mean  reversion  applies  (Cox  et al.. 1985).
133. THE CREDIT  CHANNEL IS AT WORK IN THE AFTERMATH  OF THE CRISIS
A  large  build-up  of  industrial  capacity  made  Korea  highly  vulnerable  to  the
slowing  of its economy  in  1996  and  1997.  The  fact that  growth  of productive  capacity
had  been  financed  largely  with  bank  credit  meant  that  the  vulnerability  to  an  economic
slowdown  also  extended  to the  financial  sector.  In the  face of the  adverse  consequences
of the crisis,  this vulnerability  has indeed  proven  to be more  serious  than  had  been  earlier
anticipated:  Korea  experienced  a sharp  decline  in industrial  production  at the end  of 1997
and  an even  sharper decline  in the beginning  of 1998 (Figure  2 and  Figure  3).
Figure  2  Figure  3
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Macroeconomic  policies  were  tightened  noticeably  and  far-reaching  structural
adjustment  measures  were  proposed  in late  1997  and  early  1998.  In order to  combat  the
inflationary  pressures  arising  from  currency  depreciation  and  to restore  the  credibility  of
its  foreign  exchange  and  financial  markets,  the  Central  Bank  liberalized  and  raised
interest  rates  in January  1998.  The overnight  rate peaked  at 25  percent  in January  1998,
from  11 percent  a year  before.  In the  meantime,  banks  reportedly  became  reluctant  to
lend  and  started  calling  in  loans  that  would  have  been  rolled  over  in  different
circumstances.
14An examination of both the growth rate of real loans (Figure 4), and money
market  rate along with inflation  (Figure 5) underscores  the tight monetary  conditions. As
previously  suggested,  this evidence  alone is insufficient  to conclude  that there is a "credit
crunch" in  Korea.  Nevertheless, such a  conclusion can  be drawn if we  add the
observation  that all the spreads  measuring  the credit channel  effect have widened (Figure
6). In particular,  a sharp increase  in the risk  premium  on corporate  debt is captured  by the
rising yield differential  between  corporate  and Government  bonds, measuring  the balance
sheet effect. From about 1  00 basis points  until October 1997  this spread  increased  to 197
b.p. in November 1997; it reached 899 b.p. in the following  month at the peak of the
crisis and declined  relatively  thereafter. The lending channel  effect is also at work: the
spread between the overdraft  lending rate and the yield on commercial  paper increased
markedly since September, reached 13.2 percentage points in  December 1997, and
remained  close  to 6 percentage  points  during the first two months of 1998.
Figure  4  Figure 5
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All in all, the evidence supports the existence of a credit crunch in Korea.  There
are clear indications that the credit crunch has been operating through both the balance
sheet and lending channel effects.
4. THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE MAIN RESULTS 16
The objective of our empirical framework is twofold: (i) investigating the causal
relationship between the relevant spreads and industrial production, both overall and for
the  SMEs; and  (ii)  examining the quantitative  impact of an  increase  in  the  relevant
spreads  on  industrial  production,  again  both  overall  and  for  the  SMEs.  The  first
16  The index  of industrial  production  for SMEs is that computed  by the Industrial  Bank of Korea and published  in
the monthly  bulletin  of the Bank  of Korea. All the other  data are obtained  from the website  of the Bank of Korea
over the period 1992.01-1998.02.
16investigation  will  reveal  whether  prior  movements  of  the  spreads  influence  the
development  of  industrial production.  The second  investigation helps  show  whether
SMEs are, indeed, disproportionately hurt by an increase in the relevant spreads due, for
example, to tightening in monetary policy stance or other factors.
4.1 The Direction of Causality between the Spreads and Industrial Production
Several studies have investigated the information content of spreads with respect
to  subsequent fluctuations in real economic activity, but have done so mainly  for the
largest industrialized countries." 7 We follow the standard empirical exercises employed
in  earlier  studies,  Granger  causality  tests,  to  examine  whether  the  relevant  spreads
convey  information  about  economic  activity  (industrial  production)  in  Korea.  This
technique helps identify variables that embody significant information for predicting the
future course of industrial production and this, in turn, will provide valuable guidance for
policy makers in designing economic policies.
We regress changes in industrial production on both past values of itself and past
values of the relevant spreads.  If the spread under examination is statistically significant
in this  regression, then it furnishes information about future industrial production over
and above that provided by past values of  industrial production.  This involves a series of
bi-variate Granger causality tests, where the estimated equations are of the form:
17  See for example  Friedman  and Kuttner  (1998)  as well  as Browne  and Tease  (1992).
17AY,  =  f+  I.AY,_i+F5flSPR,_i  +  v,  (2)
y  (ysME)  represents the overall (SMEs) industrial production.  As an alternative we also
used the deviation of industrial production from its trend (Y-YT)  for both the overall and
SMEs'  industrial production.' 8 SPR is an element in the set of indicator variables, which
for this  exercise includes SPRO (overdraft  lending rate-Government bond rate),  SPRI
(corporate bond rate-Government bond rate), SPR2  (overdraft lending rate-commercial
paper rate), and SPR3 (commercial paper rate-corporate bond rate).
In the sample, we use monthly data from January 1992 to February  1998.  After
investigating the time series properties of the variables involved and ascertaining that all
variables  are stationary and  integrated  same order,'9 we  compute  F-tests  for the null
hypothesis of the non-Granger causality of the relevant indicator variable and calculate
the marginal significance levels (p-values) for the bi-variate Granger causality tests  for
lag lengths of I to 12. The smaller these values, the stronger the predictive content of the
relevant indicator for the particular measure of industrial production.  Therefore, the test
results will also  shed light on the  issue of  whether the predictive power  of the these
spreads is different for the SMEs' industrial production.
The tables  in  the Appendix  present  the overall  results  of  this  exercise.  The
empirical evidence is fairly convincing that the spreads of interest are a prima facie  cause
of industrial  production,  both  overall and  for the  SMEs.  There  is no  evidence that
18  The  trend is  computed  by using  the Hodrick  and Prescot  (HP) filter.
18industrial production is a primafacie  cause of the spreads considered in our investigation.
The empirical findings from bi-variate causality tests suggest that prior movements of the
spreads influence the development of industrial production.  An interesting observation is
that the predictive content of the spreads is higher (i.e., smaller p-values) for the SMEs'
industrial production.  This is consistent with the argument that an increase in the spreads
will  disproportionately  hurt  SMEs,  for  whom  close  substitutes  for  bank  credit  are
unavailable.
In an attempt to examine the robustness of our bi-variate causality test results, we
include an important policy variable, the overnight interest rate, into equation (2) to find
out whether the spreads retain their predictive power even in the presence of a variable
capturing the  stance of monetary policy.  This  is important since the influence of the
spreads on industrial production may be due to their  response to  changes in monetary
policy.  We estimate the following equation:
AY,=  i+j(5,AY,,+jY,SPR,,i+XiAr,,+6,  (3)
where r is a short-term interest rate which reflects the stance of monetary policy.  Once
again, if the spreads have no predictive power, their coefficients will be zero.
Tables IA to 2B present the results of this exercise. The empirical findings show
that SPR I and SPR3 are no longer useful predictors of overall industrial production in the
19  Although the results of the Phillips Perron test including trend indicate that the overall industrial production is
stationary.  further inspection of autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of this variable suggests that it is
integrated order of one. 1(1).
19presence of the overnight rate.  This suggests that part of the predictive power of SPRI
and SPR3 for the overall industrial production reflects the stance of monetary policy. In
the case of the  SMEs'  industrial production,  however, SPRI  also  maintains its  strong
predictive power.  As  was the case  with  the bi-variate  causality tests,  the predictive
content of the spreads for SMEs' industrial production remains much higher.
Table IA. The Results of the Granger Causality Tests in the Presence of Ar
Lags  SPRO  _> (Y-YT)  SPR1  -(Y-Y T)  SPR2  -*  (Y-Y T )  SPR3  _> (Y-Y
T)
3  0.106056  0.564291  0.133273  0.172182
6  0.079240  0.512372  0.811497  0.437415
9  0.151473  0.266468  0.842098  0.468537
12  0.600423  0.542472  0.924405  0.974612
Note: Thze  nzumbers  in the tables  are marginal  significance  level (p-valtes)  of F Tests  for the null of non-Granger
cauisality  of the variable  in quiestion.
Table 1  B. The Results of the Granger Causality Tests for SMEs in the Presence of Ar
Lags  SPRO _0  (ys
m
E -YT)  SPR1  _* ((ysmE_y
T)  SPR2 -*  (YsME-Y T)  SPR3 .+  (ySME-yT)
3  0.000076  0.002003  0.012310  0.406410
6  0.000124  0.010026  0.142250  0.320106
9  0.004817  0.046813  0.285761  0.482191
12  0.109830  0.026956  0.479630  0.919193
Table 2A. Results of the Granger Causality Tests in the Presence of Ar
Lags  SPRO  - AY  SPR1  - AY  SPR2  - AY  SPR3  - AY
3  0.018030  0.245482  0.047421  0.129888
6  0.006957  0.122215  0.765385  0.344299
9  0.217027  0.148178  0.825930  0.897187
12  0.006957  0.613610  0.871602  0.943174
Table 2B. Results of the Granger Causality for SMEs in the Presence of Ar
Lags  SPRO  -0 AYSME  SPR1 ->  AYsmE  SPR2 -+  AYsl1E SPR3 -+  AYs?IE
3  0.000058  0.006616  0.031598  0.337026
6  0.000010  0.009168  0.461780  0.195091
9  0.002173  0.015074  0.474381  0.505333
12  0.135815  0.122086  0.831186  0.732602
204.2 The Impact  of the Spreads  on the Overall  and the SMEs'  Industrial  Production
Although our findings established that the evolution of the relevant spreads are
significant for  predicting industrial  production, particularly  in  the case  of the  SMEs'
industrial  production, they do not  reveal  any information in  terms of the quantitative
impact of the spreads on both  the overall  and the  SMEs'  industrial production.  The
estimation of an equation such as (3) for the purpose of identifying the impact of each
spread  on  economic  activity  requires  special  attention.  This  is  because  the  high
correlations between SPR and its lagged values would have a detrimental effect on the
standard errors of the estimated coefficients, ,u;.  As a matter of fact, a distributed  lag
model has rarely been posited and estimated in as general a form as that specified in (3).
A general strategy for tackling this problem, and its associated imprecision, is to
reduce the number of parameters to be estimated by assuming some pattern  for the hs.
To this end, we rely on an Almon lag scheme which provides a fairly flexible method for
reduced parameterization. 20 We impose an Almon lag structure with no constraints on the
spread variable, SPR, and estimate equation (3) using monthly data covering the period of
1992.01 -1998.02.?I
Before  presenting  the  empirical  results,  several  explanations  regarding  the
estimation procedure are in order.  First, we have to choose a strategy for determining the
degree and the lag length of the polynomial.  Since we use monthly data,  we choose the
20  See Alnion (1962) for more on this.
21  We include seasonal dummies in each estimation.
21lag length  12.  Next,  once the lag length is specified, following Anderson  (1971) we
consider  the  highest-degree  polynomial  possible  (seven  in  our  case)  and  then  go
backwards, until one of the hypotheses is rejected. 22 As far as the selection of the lag
length for AY and Ar is considered, we rely on Hendry's  General-to-specific-Modeling
strategy. 23 We include 12 lags on each term and eliminate the lags whose coefficients are
not statistically significant.  Finally, we obtain the long-run or equilibrium effects of the
relevant  spreads  from  the  estimates  yielded  by  equation  (3)  as  the  sum  of  the  lag
coefficients (e.g.,  _L). 
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The empirical results are reported in tables 3-6.  In each case, we examine the
residuals  of  estimated  regressions  carefully to  make  sure  that  they  are  white  noise.
Further, we also check stability of the estimated regressions using the CUSUM test due to
Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975).  The results indicate that the estimated regressions are
stable over the period studied, thus confirming the structural stability of the models.
Figure 7 contrasts the effects of each spread at different lag length on industrial
production, both overall and for the SMEs.
22  Indeed. without choosing the lag length. it is quite difficult to determine the  appropriate  degree of  the
polynomial.  As an additional  exercises.  we  employed  Ramsey  RESET  test as suggested  by Harper  (1977)  to test
both the degree  and order of the Almon  polynomial  lag used for SPR in our benchmark  specifications  against  a
number  of alternative  patterns  for SPR. The results  failed  to reject  our benchmark  specifications.
23  See  Gilbert  (1986)  for  more  on this.
24  It should be noted that the sum of the estimated  coefficients  on the distributed  lag has the interpretation  of the
long run effect  of SPR  on industrial  production  only if all variables  involved  are stationary.
22Table 3. Lag Distribution  of  SPRO
Lag  Distribution  ofSPRO  (for  overall  industrialproduction)  Lag  Distribution  of SPRO  (for  SMEs)
Lags  Coefficient  Std.  Error  T-Stat  Lags  Coefficient  Std.  Error  T-Stat
0  -0.0040  0.0012  -3.4945  0  -0.0033  0.0009  -3.7124
1  -0.0037  0.0008  -4.9267  1  -0.0024  0.0005  -4.7460
2  -0.0025  0.0009  -2.7676  2  -0.0020  0.0007  -2.9516
3  -0.0010  0.0008  -1.2608  3  -0.0018  0.0006  -2.8477
4  0.0004  0.0007  0.5004  4  -0.0015  0.0006  -2.6181
5  0.0011  0.0008  1.3307  5  -0.0011  0.0006  -1.7232
6  0.0012  0.0009  1.3434  6  -0.0005  0.0006  -0.7200
7  0.0006  0.0008  0.7414  7  0.0002  0.0006  0.3922
8  -0.0005  0.0008  -0.6094  8  0.0008  0.0006  1.3653
9  -0.0017  0.0010  -1.6724  9  0.0009  0.0007  1.3240
10  -0.0024  0.0011  -2.1628  10  0.0003  0.0008  0.3931
11  -0.0020  0.0011  -1.8710  11  -0.0016  0.0008  -1.9976
12  0.0004  0.0025  0.1614  12  -0.0053  0.0017  -3.0380
Sum  of  lags  -0.0141  0.0048  -2.9528  Sum  of lags  |  -0.0171  0.0037  -4.6457
Summary Statistics  Summary Statistics
Adj.  R2= 0.891  D-W=  2.08  Adj.  R2=0.897  D-W=  1.98
S.E.  of Regression  = 0.005  F= 19.9  q=4  S.E.  of regression  = 0.0161  F= 26.8  q=4
Note:  Standard  errors  are Newvey-West  heteroskedastic  and autocorrelation  consistent  standard  errors. q stands  for the
degree  of the polynomial.
Table 4. Lag Distribution  of SPRI
Lag  Distribution  of SPRI (for  overall  industrialproduction)  Lag  Distribution  of SPRI (for  SMEs)
Lags  Coefficient  Std. Error  T-Stat  Lags  Coellicient  Std.  Error  T-Stat
0  -0.0063  0.0018  -3.5692  0  -0.0063  0.0012  -5.0838
1  -0.0044  0.0011  -4.1196  1  -0.0042  0.0008  -5.0018
2  -0.0028  0.0010  -2.9399  2  -0.0025  0.0008  -3.0741
3  -0.0015  0.0012  -1.2113  3  -0.0011  0.0010  -1.1381
4  -0.0005  0.0015  -0.3038  4  -0.0001  0.0011  -0.0750
5  0.0003  0.0017  0.1708  5  0.0006  0.0012  0.4791
6  0.0007  0.0016  0.4410  6  0.0009  0.0012  0.7449
7  0.0009  0.0015  0.5811  7  0.0008  0.0011  0.7700
8  0.0007  0.0013  0.5608  8  0.0004  0.0009  0.4401
9  0.0003  0.0013  0.2412  9  -0.0004  0.0009  -0.4339
10  -0.0004  0.0016  -0.2612  10  -0.0015  0.0011  -1.3384
11  -0.0014  0.0024  -0.5947  11  -0.0030  0.0017  -1.7653
12  -0.0028  0.0036  -0.7753  12  -0.0048  0.0025  -1.9463
Sumi  of lags  -0.0172  0.0104  -1.6528  Sum of lags  1  -0.0212  0.0073  -2.9050
Summary Statistics  Summary  Statistics
AdI. R2=0.890  D-W=  2.18  Adj. R-=0.889  D-W=  2.14
S.E.  of Regression  = 0.027  F= 19.9  q=2  S.E. of regression  = 0.017  F= 27.9  q=2
23Table 5. Lag Distribution of SPR2
Lag Distribution of SPR2 (for  overall  industrial  production)  Lag Distribution  of SPR2 (for  SMEs)
Lags  Coefficient  Std. Error  T-Stat  Lags  Coefficient  Std.  Error  T-Stat
0  0.0007  0.0019  0.3795  0  -0.0027  0.0017  -1.5400
1  0.0008  0.0013  0.5761  1  -0.0027  0.0009  -2.9223
2  0.0008  0.0010  0.7881  2  -0.0024  0.0010  -2.3782
3  0.0007  0.0008  0.8511  3  -0.0017  0.0011  -1.5680
4  0.0006  0.0008  0.7103  4  -0.0009  0.0010  -0.8885
5  0.0004  0.0009  0.5016  5  0.0000  0.0008  -0.0348
6  0.0003  0.0009  0.2752  6  0.0007  0.0007  0.9532
7  0.0000  0.0009  0.0041  7  0.0012  0.0009  1.3477
8  -0.0003  0.0008  -0.3524  8  0.0013  0.0010  1.2230
9  -0.0006  0.0009  -0.7360  9  0.0008  0.0010  0.7691
10  -0.0010  0.0011  -0.9377  10  -0.0003  0.0010  -0.3599
11  -0.0015  0.0015  -0.9478  11  -0.0023  0.0014  -1.6602
12  -0.0020  0.0022  -0.8951  12  -0.0052  0.0028  -1.8585
Sum of lags  -0.0012  0.0097  -0.1207  Sum of lags  -0.0143  0.0079  -1.8221
Summary Statistics  Summary Statistics
Adj.  R  = 0.888  D-W=  2.10  Adj.  R =0.833  D-W=  1.79
S.E. of Regression  =0.025  F= 18.8  q=2  S.E.  of regression  =0.020  F= 17.4  q=3
Table 6. Lag Distribution of SPR3
Lag Distribution  of SPR3 (for  overall  industrial  production)  Lag Distribution  of SPR3 (for  SMEs)
Lags  Coefficient  Std. Error  T-Stat  Lags  Coefficient  Std. Error  T-Stat
0  -0.0084  0.0029  -2.8999  0  -0.0091  0.0023  -3.9942
1  -0.0054  0.0019  -2.8322  1  -0.0062  0.0015  -4.1611
2  -0.0030  0.0014  -2.1085  2  -0.0038  0.0011  -3.5627
3  -0.0010  0.0014  -0.7265  3  -0.0018  0.0010  -1.7309
4  0.0004  0.0016  0.2463  4  -0.0003  0.0012  -0.2293
5  0.0013  0.0018  0.7208  5  0.0008  0.0013  0.5695
6  0.0017  0.0019  0.9086  6  0.0013  0.0014  0.9657
7  0.0016  0.0018  0.8823  7  0.0014  0.0013  1.0992
8  0.0009  0.0016  0.5780  8  0.0011  0.0012  0.9300
9  -0.0003  0.0015  -0.1736  9  0.0003  0.0011  0.2429
10  -0.0019  0.0017  -1.1551  10  -0.0010  0.0013  -0.8155
11  -0.0042  0.0024  -1.7221  11  -0.0028  0.0019  -1.5085
12  -0.0069  0.0035  -1.9411  12  -0.0050  0.0027  -1.8305
Sutm  of lags  -0.0252  0.0102  -2.4633  Sumn of lags  -0.0251  0.0077  -3.2769
Summary Statistics  Stimmary Statistics
Adj. RI= 0.875  D-W=  2.16  Adj. R2=0.854  D-W=  1.72
S.E. of Regression=0.031  F= 18.1  q=2  S.E.  of regression=0.019  F=22.6  q=2
24Figure  7. The Effects of the Spreads  on Industrial  Production
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The empirical results indicate that SPRO,  which captures the overall impact of the
credit channel, has a negative and statistically significant effect on industrial production,
both overall and for the SMEs, in  the long-run. As  was expected, SPRO has  a larger
impact on SMEs'  industrial production.  More precisely, a 1 percentage point increase in
SPRO reduces the overall  (SMEs')  industrial  production  in the long-run  by  1.4 (1.7)
percentage points.  Similarly, SPRI  and SPR2,  reflecting the balance sheet and lending
channel  effects,  have  a  larger  and  a  statistically  more  significant  effect  on  SMEs'
industrial production compared to that of overall industrial production.  An increase in
25SPR3, which proxies the slope of the yield curve, also has a negative and statistically
significant effect on both the overall and SMEs'  industrial production, roughly by equal
magnitude.
In sum, the hypothesis that the quantitative impact of an increase in the spread of
interest on SMEs'  industrial production is greater than that of the overall production is
strongly supported.  In all cases. except SPR3, the spread in question has a bigger (and
statistically significant) impact on SMEs'  production than the overall production in the
long-run.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The present  paper has  sought  to  investigate  the  impact  of monetary/financial
shocks on real economic activity  as they are magnified through the economy via the
credit channel.  Our investigation has focused on a country suffering from the fallouts of
the Asian crisis, namely Korea, where such adverse effects appear to have undermined
economic recovery.  In particular, we were concerned with two main issues.  First, we
wanted to  ascertain whether, and  to what  extent, interest rate  spreads capturing credit
channel  effects could  help  predict  subsequent  fluctuations  in  real  economic  activity.
Within  such a  context, our  second  aim was to  test whether  small and  medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) suffer more than other businesses do from the adverse consequences
of the credit channel.
26The results  of our  investigation carry implications  policy for makers:  to  what
extent should monetary restrictions be used to achieve stabilization after credit channel
amplifying effects are factored in and  should compensating actions be pursued?
The main  conclusion that emerged  from  our study  was that  spreads capturing
credit channel effects contain significant information for predicting the future course of
industrial production in Korea.  Moreover, the hypothesis that SMEs suffer more than
other  businesses  do  from  the  adverse  effects  of  the  credit  channel  received  strong
empirical support.  Given the increase in the spread between the bank lending rate and the
Government bond rate, triggered by the crisis as well as by the monetary restriction, our
results  suggest that  the decline in  industrial production attributable to  the magnifying
effects of credit channel variables may well be beyond 5 percentage points for the Korean
industrial sector as a whole, and even close to  10 percent for SMEs.
We can draw two main policy implications.  First, policy makers neglecting credit
channel effects might be "overkilling the economy".  Second, although further analyses
are required to devise proper market-based measures, it might be desirable to  provide
relief to those particular business segments, such as the SMEs, that unduly suffer from
monetary/financial shocks-.
27APPENDIX
THE RESULTS OF UNIT ROOT TESTS AND GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS
Table A.1 Order of Integration: The Results of the Phillips Perron Test
Level  First Difference
Variables  without  trend  with trend  without  trend  with trend
SPRO  -3.84***  -4.57***
SPRI  -3.22  **  -3.24  *
SPR2  -7.20***  -7.36***
SPR3  -3.16 **-432
Y  -1.58  -4.68**  -11.18***  -11.17***
yS
M E  -1.82  -1.98  -7.58***  -7.76
r  -1.75  -1.66  -7.12***  -7.34
Note:***.  *, * indicate rejection of the nimil  hy'pothesis  of a uinit  root at the 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels
Table A.2  The Results of the Granger  Causality  Tests (SPRO)
Lags  SPRO _> (Y-YT)  (Y-YT) --* SPRO  SPR0 -+  AY  AY  ->  SPRO
1  0.000253  0.421541  0.003133  0.365248
2  0.001829  0.090765  0.000383  0.370616
3  0.000998  0.193492  0.000161  0.424331
4  0.002823  0.313370  0.000529  0.579989
5  0.006708  0.318166  0.000234  0.618182
6  0.003328  0.327145  0.000427  0.674612
7  0.001909  0.449849  0.001051  0.553018
8  0.002556  0.369487  0.000911  0.503327
9  0.006559  0.454385  0.000721  0.143200
10  0.007157  0.119939  0.003434  0.210829
11  0.010487  0.153437  0.001370  0.176898
12  0.003578  0.067739  0.006081  0.214803
Note: Th2e  numbers in the tables are marginal significance level (p-values)  of F Tests for the
nuill of non-Granger causalitv of the variable in quiestion.
Table A.3 The Results of the Granger Causality Tests for SMEs (SPRO)
Lags  SPRO  -0 (YSMlEy T)  (ysMEy
T)  __  SPRO  SPRO  -0 AYs mE  AYsmE  -+  SPRO
1  0.000007  0.366753  0.000010  0.627567
2  0.000024  0.392168  0.000006  0.610966
3  0.000044  0.525943  0.000007  0.766206
4  0.000129  0.725483  0.000003  0.891177
5  0.000075  0.812896  0.000001  0.935094
6  0.000151  0.874587  0.000008  0.939586
7  0.000580  0.956910  0.000024  0.898938
8  0.001075  0.940003  0.000095  0.895418
9  0.001909  0.906887  0.000066  0.505598
10  0.000468  0.393503  0.004412  0.595184
11  0.044009  0.480604  0.006148  0.206297
12  0.060984  0.299424  0.054698  0.247443
28Table A.4 The Results of the Granger Causality Tests  (SPRI)
Lags  SPRI _+ (y_yT )  (y_y T ) __ SPR1  SPR1  --  AY  AY ->  SPR1
1  0.005780  0.248298  0.042147  0.711989
2  0.024877  0.261905  0.003750  0.453019
3  0.056635  0.349566  0.009535  0.524120
4  0.014436  0.144809  0.011868  0.498272
5  0.030534  0.215705  0.002888  0.757003
6  0.010924  0.299894  0.001962  0.813900
7  0.008532  0.343769  0.005748  0.721370
8  0.001201  0.353076  0.000285  0.829879
9  0.002264  0.463928  0.000633  0.586192
10  0.007200  0.235026  0.001918  0.671385
11  0.010163  0.243293  0.003827  0.564218
12  0.031551  0.147581  0.026637  0.633301
Table A.5 The Results of Granger Causality Tests for SMEs (SPRI)
Lags  SPRI  _,  (ysm-Y)  (YSMr.yT)  -*  SPR1  SPR1  -+  \y"SE  AYS%IE  _  SPRI
1  0.000112  0.706509  0.000153  0.462596
2  0.000032  0.566871  0.000041  0.709466
3  0.000049  0.783469  0.000094  0.875284
4  0.000139  0.660106  0.000004  0.957626
5  0.000124  0.775801  0.000005  0.994724
6  0.000144  0.822484  0.000026  0.998777
7  0.000240  0.919731  0.000030  0.987573
8  0.000083  0.936621  0.000043  0.994052
9  0.000291  0.970070  0.000101  0.644859
10  0.000173  0.503879  0.001799  0.802473
11  0.009629  0.546344  0.001633  0.438422
12  0.000144  0.519688  0.004723  0.455931
Table A.6 The Results of the Cranger Causality Tests (SPR2)
Lags  SPR2 _+ (y_y T )  (Y-Y T) -+  SPR2  SPR2  -> AY  AY -+  SPR2
1  0.001496  0.965903  0.005277  0.210301
2  0.000850  0.274793  0.002567  0.465216
3  0.000724  0.359815  0.000168  0.258726
4  0.001996  0.415332  0.002188  0.478551
5  0.009867  0.539080  0.005203  0.602956
6  0.017649  0.608159  0.004880  0.668512
7  0.019662  0.821020  0.010434  0.622101
8  0.020929  0.764570  0.015915  0.457850
9  0.050591  0.736516  0.089655  0.136640
10  0.170212  0.193955  0.201203  0.123481
11  0.184471  0.183160  0.020867  0.093178
12  0.026758  0.195641  0.071143  0.123203
29Table A.7 The Results of the Granger Causality Tests for SMEs (SPR2)
Lags  SPR2  >  (YSMEY
T )  (ySM[yT)  _+  SPR2  SPR2  - AYIE  AYSIIE  - SPR2
1  0.000145  0.579863  0.000164  0.578399
2  0.000240  0.557261  0.000209  0.549883
3  0.000555  0.510354  0.000264  0.376380
4  0.000993  0.572678  0.001771  0.673984
5  0.003269  0.664652  0.004473  0.740548
6  0.009480  0.779710  0.013335  0.854323
7  0.008636  0.822359  0.020772  0.639255
8  0.015575  0.801752  0.048588  0.743295
9  0.037056  0.880243  0.056224  0.650631
10  0.042257  0.656410  0.152193  0.544198
11  0.256856  0.647512  0.179287  0.461359
12  0.204920  0.675931  0.431166  0.603936
Table A.8 The Results of the Granger Causality Tests (SPR3)
Lags  SPR3 ->  (Y-YT)  (y-y T)  _+  SPR3  SPR3  - AY  AY -*  SPR3
1  0.042944  0.071893  0.012664  0.516598
2  0.051770  0.151182  0.037029  0.935513
3  0.079754  0.254931  0.044539  0.982877
4  0.035479  0.172061  0.003816  0.952598
5  0.025042  0.344208  0.000689  0.482929
6  0.019531  0.069168  0.001551  0.108434
7  0.008612  0.005996  0.001265  0.169300
8  0.021526  0.011300  0.002443  0.145584
9  0.026188  0.050115  0.004650  0.122617
10  0.082263  0.096837  0.029021  0.096047
11  0.080841  0.065741  0.041096  0.040503
12  0.227276  0.041363  0.159739  0.037367
Table A.9 The Results of the Granger Causality Tests for SMEs (SPR3)
Lags  SPR3  (ysrEyT)  (ysMEyT)  SPR3  SPR3 o  AYE  AYSME  - SPR3
1  0.010787  0.084210  0.012664  0.516598
2  0.017383  0.219740  0.037029  0.935513
3  0.093217  0.321485  0.044539  0.982877
4  0.092417  0.360202  0.003816  0.952598
5  0.022819  0.417447  0.000689  0.482929
6  0.018576  0.137477  0.001551  0.108434
7  0.006947  0.067858  0.001265  0.169300
8  0.012963  0.108970  0.002443  0.145584
9  0.024391  0.133442  0.004650  0.122617
10  0.019951  0.069411  0.029021  0.096047
11  0.089579  0.091870  0.041096  0.040503
12  0.296823  0.059305  0.159739  0.037367
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